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Abstract 
 
We consider three competing normative theories of how to make choices when facing 
uncertainty: subjective expected utility, maximin utility and minimax regret. In simple 
decision problems, we compare how decision makers under each of these theories value 
safe options, freedom of choice and information. We then use these models to predict 
answers to questions in the European Values Survey and use these predictions via a 
latent class analysis to estimate the distribution of these behaviors across Europe. We 
find a larger proportion of Bayesians in the Northern countries than in Southern 
countries. The opposite is true for maximin utility behavior. Only a few are consistent 
with minimax regret behavior. 
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Decision Makers Facing Uncertainty:
Theory versus Evidence
Paolo E. Giordaniy Karl H. Schlagz Sanne Zwartx
1 Introduction
In the decision-theoretic literature several alternative approaches have been developed
to deal with choice under uncertainty. We consider three di¤erent axiomatic approaches
to uncertainty where uncertainty refers to not knowing the distribution of the under-
lying states. In the Bayesian or subjective expected utility model (Savage, 1954) un-
certainty is transformed into risk by assessing a probability distribution over the set
of possible states. The maximin utility model (Wald, 1950, Milnor, 1954) is only con-
cerned with the worst outcome possible for each choice. Minimax regret (Savage, 1951,
Milnor, 1954) captures aversion to lost opportunities.
Our aim is to investigate the implications of these alternative behavioral models.
At rst we identify three contexts where attitudes towards uncertainty play a role. For
each context we set up an elementary decision problem and then compare predictions
of the three models. Later we use the resulting classications of behavior in the three
di¤erent contexts to uncover similarities and di¤erences in human behavior across
Europe. To achieve this we identify questions from the European Values Survey (EVS)
that can be studied within the contexts we modeled, and use a latent class analysis to
estimate the distribution of behavioral types across Europe.
The authors would like to thank participants at the 2006 EEA conference in Vienna for their com-
ments. Paolo Giordani thankfully acknowlegdes nancial support from the Max Weber Programme,
EUI. The usual disclaimers apply.
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Each decision problem is constructed to uncover a specic feature of uncertainty,
which we can also nd in the questions in the EVS. The decision problems have in
common the fact that payo¤s depend on some unknown state. In safe versus uncertain
we are interested in the general attitude towards uncertainty. Here we consider a
decision maker (DM) who has to choose between a safe option and an option yielding
an uncertain outcome. The DM can avoid uncertainty by choosing the safe option at
the expense of possibly foregoing better outcomes. In freedom of choicewe wish to
investigate how confrontation with uncertainty inuences incentives to use initiative.
The idea is that preferences for an active or for a passive position can be inuenced by
how good one thinks one is in dealing with uncertainty. We confront the DM with a
decision problem and ask her whether she wants to make the choice herself or whether
she wants to leave the choice up to someone else instead. In value of informationwe
investigate how the attitude towards uncertainty inuences the willingness to invest in
reducing uncertainty by acquiring more information. Information is costly but possibly
reveals which state will occur.
In all three decision problems we nd that choice varies across the di¤erent be-
havioral models. Combining our ndings across these three problems, we identify the
following behavioral patterns. Bayesians may or may not like safe choices, like to exert
their freedom of choice and give relatively low value to information. Maximin utility
DMs like safe options, like freedom of choice and value information highly. Finally,
minimax regret DMs are willing to partially engage in uncertain scenarios, moderately
like freedom of choice and like to have more information.
In the second step we select the questions asked in the EVS that can be associated
to the aspects or contexts surrounding uncertainty we have been modeling. To give an
example, the following question from the EVS questionnaire is linked to the freedom
of choiceproblem: Would you mention the opportunity to use initiativeas an im-
portant aspect in a job?. We nd ve relevant questions. Job security and long-term
relationships are interpreted as safe options. Choosing to use initiative as well as em-
phasizing the value of teaching independence to ones own children is associated to the
preference for freedom of choice. Preference for a job with not too much pressure is
considered as a signal that information is valuable. By establishing a link between the
questions and our choice problems we can predict the responses of our three behavioral
types to the EVS questions. This allows us to categorize individuals by comparing the
arrays of their answers and to thereby empirically gain insights into how Europeans
deal with uncertainty.
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In the empirical analysis we focus on EVS data from 1999 and consider the fteen
countries belonging to European Union at that date (EU15). We wish to classify
how many individuals provide answers that are consistent with each of the behavioral
models and to compare the resulting frequencies across Europe. To do this we perform
a latent class analysis, where a class is dened by a DM type. The three behavioral
patterns identied in the theoretical analysis guide us when imposing the constraints
necessary to dene the types. For example, if theory suggests that the maximin type
likes safe options, we impose its preference for job security and long-term relationship.
One additional unspecied (or free) type is added to allow for alternative behavior.
For each type an array of probabilities of each answer across all questions is estimated.
This estimation is done for the entire data set so that types are comparable across
countries. Goodness of t is assessed. In particular, we nd support for explaining the
data with four types, one behavioral type for each normative model together with the
addition free type. The evidence is thus favorable to the restrictions identied in the
theoretical analysis.
Across Europe we nd around 69% of the sample population to be classied into
one of the three behavioral types identied by the theory. In particular, the proportions
of Bayesian, maximin utility and minimax regret types average around 39%, 23% and
6% respectively. The remaining 31% fall within the fourth type.
The fourth type is unconstrained, in the sense that no restriction is imposed on
its choices. The estimation of the answer probabilities across all questions gives us its
behavioral characterization. This type neither likes nor dislikes safe options, strongly
dislikes freedom of choice and does not su¤er pressure. The essentially passivenature
of this type, which prefers that choices are made by others, seems to be its most
distinctive feature.
As types are not country-specic but dened uniformly across Europe we can com-
pare frequencies across countries. Overall we nd remarkable di¤erences in the cultural
attitude towards uncertainty across European countries. Proportions of Bayesians are
typically higher than the average across both continental countries (such as Austria,
Germany and the Netherlands) and Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland and
Sweden), while they are typically lower than the average in Mediterranean countries
(Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal) and, to some extent, in Ireland. Roughly the op-
posite pattern holds for the maximin utility type, whose fractions are generally high
in southern European countries and low in most continental and Nordic European
countries. In light of the distinctive features of these two types identied above, we
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can thus essentially conrm the north-south interpretation (Hofstede, 2001 among
others; see below for a comparison), which is the idea that individuals in southern
European countries have a more conservative attitude towards uncertainty than the
ones in the northern and continental countries. We also nd an east-west divide in the
sense that the majority of types in France, Portugal, Spain and Belgium fall within the
fourth free type. Western European countries are less clearly captured by the predic-
tions of our theoretical models. Finally, the proportions of minimax regret types are
instead lower and generally more homogeneous across European countries albeit with
a slight tendency to more behavior consistency with minimax regret in the north.
The empirical part of this paper can be compared to the cross-country comparative
psychological literature, which is aimed at assessing essential di¤erences in cultural
traits across countries. In particular, Hofstede (2001) has built the uncertainty avoid-
ance index (UAI), which measures the extent to which the members of a culture
feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations(Hofstede, 2001, p. 263). Our
approach is however methodologically distant from Hofstedes one. Hofstede equally
weighs the answers to three questions where answers are connected to behavior under
uncertainty via analogy, and then builds an index ranking all countries from the least
to the most uncertainty avoiding. We instead use decision theory to formulate pre-
dictions on the choices of di¤erent types along a series of behavioral dimensions (safe
vs. uncertain, freedom, value of information). In a latent class analysis we then check
whether our theoretical predictions can be accepted, and if so, evaluate the relative
proportions of the di¤erent DM types across EU15 countries. Among other things, we
also nd evidence in favor of the north-southinterpretation.
This paper can also be related to the literature on ambiguity, where by ambiguity it
is meant the lack of a (single) prior over the possible states of nature or, equivalently, the
tendency not to reduce uncertainty to risk (Ellsberg, 1961, Schmeidler, 1989, Gilboa-
Schmeidler, 1989). In light of this denition Bayesians are una¤ected by ambiguity,
as they form priors, while maximin and minimax regret behaviors perceive the choice
scenario as ambiguous as they do not form priors. Moreover, we can go further in our
interpretation of the free type, and consider its aversion towards freedom of choice as
contradicting the essential spirit of Bayesianism. We can then interpret our ndings as
providing evidence in favor of DMs in northern and continental countries perceiving a
relatively less ambiguous choice environment and, hence, being more prone to transform
uncertainty into risk than DMs in southern countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce
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and compare the three alternative choice models. In Section 3 we construct the three
decision problems and analyze the choices under each model. In Section 4 we link
these problems to EVS questions, formulate and test our predictions. In Section 5 we
present and comment on the ndings.
2 Axiomatic Choice under Uncertainty
According to Knight (1921), uncertainty - as opposed to risk - is associated with
decision problems where no objective probability distribution over the states of the
world is given. There are several di¤erent axiomatic models of decision making under
uncertainty. We restrict our attention to the following three approaches: the subjective
expected utility criterion (Savage, 1954, Anscombe and Aumann, 1963), the maximin
utility decision rule (Wald, 1950) and the minimax regret criterion (Savage, 1951).
Subjective expected utility (SEU) theory is based on axioms that extend Von Neumann-
Morgensterns expected utility principle, originally developed for risk, to the case of
uncertainty. Accordingly, it is as if the decision maker (DM) subjectively assesses a
probability distribution (or prior) over the states of the world, and then selects the
action that yields the highest (subjective) expected utility. Discomfort with this ap-
proach of treating uncertainty as risk has led to a recent resurgence of alternative
theories. Notice also that evidence in neuroscience (Rustichini et al., 2002) shows that
di¤erent parts of the brain are used depending on whether there is risk or uncertainty.
The most common alternative is the maximin utility criterion. It was introduced
by Wald (1950), axiomatized by Milnor (1954) and recently by Stoye (2006), and
has received increasing attention since Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). It is as if the
following scenario takes place. The DM expects to be punished by a malevolent
Nature. She fears for any choice that the worst outcome possible under this choice
will occur. Her sole concern is therefore to defend herself by choosing the action that
maximizes this worst outcome. Randomization can be useful as the worst outcome is
dened in expected terms once outcomes have been transformed into von Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities. Note that the maximin utility decision rule can be interpreted
as resulting from extreme pessimism. However, it cannot be associated to extreme risk
aversion, since the degree of risk aversion is already captured in the measurement of
utilities or payo¤s.
An alternative approach that has recently attracted attention is the minimax regret
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criterion (Savage, 1951), axiomatized by Milnor (1954) and also by Stoye (2006). Here
the DM does not care about the outcome per se but about lost opportunities. She is
worried about not correctly anticipating which state of the world will occur and hence
about not making the best choice that can be made ex post. Regret measures the loss
due to not making the best choice ex post. Analogous to the maximin utility criterion,
the DM fears that she is facing a malevolent Nature which is trying to maximize her
regret, and consequently the DM defends herself by choosing the (mixed) action that
minimizes maximal regret. Randomization is typically benecial in this defence. Note
that, while regret is dened in terms of hindsight, one should not interpret this as a
model of a DM who lives in the past since this DM is assumed to anticipate possible
future regret when making choices. Anticipation of aversion to lost opportunities nds
support in experiments by Zeelenberg (1999)1.
Both the maximin utility criterion and the minimax regret criterion have been
given behavioral interpretations. However their foundations are purely axiomatic. In
particular, the application of minimax regret does not depend on whether or not there
is information ex post about which state occurred. Both criteria should be seen in
light of their axiomatic foundations. The key departure from SEU is founded in the
Symmetry Axiom. SEU allows via the prior for di¤erent states to be treated di¤erently.
The Symmetry Axiom rules out this possibility as it postulates that choice may not
depend on labels. The underlying idea is that the denition of the decision problem
must include all relevant aspects. If the decision maker nevertheless would like to make
a choice that is not invariant to the relabelling of states and actions, then this would
contradict the postulate that the denition of the decision problem captures all relevant
aspects. Both the maximin utility criterion and the minimax regret criterion satisfy the
Symmetry Axiom together with an additional convexity axiom which is associated to
ambiguity aversion. According to the latter, when indi¤erent between two actions, the
DM prefers to randomize between them in order to better protect against uncertainty.
The maximin utility criterion and the minimax regret criterion di¤er in terms of which
axioms of SEU are relaxed. Recall that Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
postulates that preferences are not allowed to change if new actions are added. This
should not be confused with the Independence Axiom that is used to enable rearranging
mathematical terms and is associated to time consistent choice. The maximin utility
decision rule satises IIA but only a weaker version of the Independence Axiom. The
1Minimax regret should not be confused with other forms of regret to incorporate lost opportunities
when facing risk such as Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982).
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added thrust of the Symmetry Axiom together with ambiguity aversion embedded in
the convexity axiom focuses attention on the worst outcome generated by each action.
The DM seems to be extremely pessimistic. However, once IIA is relaxed, the outcome
is less extreme despite Symmetry and ambiguity aversion. The minimax regret criterion
satises Symmetry, ambiguity aversion, Independence and the following weaker version
of IIA. Preferences are now allowed to depend on the set of actions available, a property
called menu dependence. In order to achieve a form of consistent behavior across
di¤erent sets or menus, the Independence to Never Best Alternatives (INA) axiom is
postulated. Actions may be added without changing preferences as long as they do not
change the outcome of an omniscient decision maker who knows which state will occur.
In other words, the best outcome in each state cannot be changed. This invariance to
situations that do not a¤ect the well being of such an omniscient decision maker turns
the focus to the best outcome in each state and thus leads to concern for regret.
We will focus on these three ways to deal with uncertainty: reversion to risk,
extreme pessimism and aversion to lost opportunities.
Let us sum up the philosophy of choice behind each of the three decision criteria
presented above. The Bayesian (or cool) decision maker always addresses uncertain
settings by forming priors and making the necessary expected utility calculations. The
maximin utility (or gloomy) DM has a highly conservative attitude towards uncer-
tainty and acts as if the worst state of nature were certain to occur, while the minimax
regret (or anxious) DM is concerned with not missing advantageous opportunities.
We proceed by comparing the choices of these three di¤erent decision makers in
three specic settings, each focusing on a particular aspect of uncertainty. We investi-
gate the benets of safe actions, measure the freedom of choice and capture the value
of information. Each of the settings points to a most basic behavioral trait. In a
later section we will use our analysis to uncover underlying motives by looking at the
answers to some of the questions posed in the European Values Survey.
3 Uncovering Models of Choice under Uncertainty
3.1 Safe versus Uncertain
At the heart of choice under uncertainty is the question of how one trades o¤making a
safe choice against making a choice that yields an uncertain outcome. We investigate
how the evaluation of uncertainty inuences this tradeo¤. Consider the following simple
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payo¤  
safe c c
uncertain l h
Table 1: The safe vs. uncertaindecision problem.
decision problem with two actions labelled safeand uncertainand two states labelled
 and  shown in Table 1 where h > c > l. Note that this can also be interpreted
as a tradeo¤ between risk and uncertainty. One can imagine that c is the expected
value of a risky outcome to be contrasted with the choice of uncertainthat has a truly
uncertain outcome. We derive the most preferred choice for each of the three di¤erent
decision makers.
The Bayesian DM assesses a subjective probability for the occurrence of each of the
two states. If the bad state for the uncertain choice, state , is su¢ ciently likely then
the Bayesian chooses the safe action. More specically, if  denotes the probability
that state  is believed to occur then the Bayesian chooses the safe action if  >
(h  c) = (h  l) and chooses the risky if  < (h  c) = (h  l) : In particular, if  6=
(h  c) = (h  l) then the Bayesian will not randomize. Typically one does not even
consider the case where  = (h  c) = (h  l) as this prior is considered degenerate.
However, even if this knife-edge case is considered, one would not predict that the
Bayesian randomizes albeit with no specic formal reasoning.
A maximin utility DM always chooses safe. This is immediate when considering
only pure actions since c > l. However it is also true when one includes all mixed
actions. This can be seen by considering the ctitious zero sum game between the DM
and the malevolent Nature, in which the objective of DM is to maximize utility while
that of Nature is to minimize it. It is well known (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1947) that the equilibrium strategy of the DM in this ctitious game solves the maximin
utility criterion. Now note that the pair (safe, ) is an equilibrium of this zero sum
game. Hence safeattains maximin utility. Here we see the pessimism of the maximin
utility criterion at work. Regardless of how large l or h; as long as l < c, this DM
always chooses safe.
To analyze the choice of the minimax regret DM we transform utility into regret
(see Table 2). The unique mixed action that attains minimax regret involves choosing
safewith probability (c  l) = (h  l) and uncertainwith probability (h  c) = (h  l).
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regret  
safe 0 h  c
uncertain c  l 0
Table 2: The safe vs. uncertaindecision problem in terms of regret.
In particular, there is always a strictly positive probability of choosing uncertain.
The minimax regret criterion trades o¤ the magnitudes of possible loss (c  l) against
possible gain (h  l). A small probability is put on safe if and only if the ratio
of possible loss to possible gain is small. The value of minimax regret is equal to
(h  c) (c  l) = (h  l). Note here the advantage of mixing, which guarantees regret to
be strictly below the maximal regret of safeequal to (h  c) and of uncertainequal
to (c  l) :
To summarize, the tradeo¤ of the Bayesian is embedded in the prior. While some
Bayesians will choose safe others will choose uncertain. The conservatism of the
maximin utility DM leads her to always choose safe. Fear of missing advantageous
opportunities causes the minimax regret DM neither to choose safenor uncertain
but instead to randomize between these two actions.
3.2 Freedom of Choice
We investigate the tradeo¤ between freedom of choiceand giving the responsibility
for choice to others. We wish to understand how the model of choice for facing uncer-
tainty inuences the value of being allowed to choose in contrast with letting someone
else choose and following their instructions. The latter situation can arise through
delegation or by entering a relationship in which one no longer makes the choice. We
build our model around the following simple decision problem. There are two actions
and two states with a unique best action in each state and where di¤erent states have
di¤erent best actions. Actions are labelled A and B, states labelled  and , and
payo¤s shown in Table 3. We impose y > x and z > w to create a di¤erent best action
in each state and assume further x < z and w < y in order to ensure that not all
outcomes in one state are smaller than all outcomes in the other state.
Let us embed this choice between two actions in the following larger decision prob-
lem that has two stages. In the rst stage, the decision maker has to decide whether
she wishes to make the choice herself or whether instead she prefers to have the choice
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payo¤  
A y w
B x z
Table 3: The decision problem faced in stage 2 when choosing freein stage 1.
payo¤  
free yz xw
y x+z w
yz xw
y x+z w
third y + (1  )x w + (1  ) z
Table 4: The decision problem faced in stage 1 by a maximin utility agent.
made by a third party. In the second stage the actual choice between A and B occurs.
At the time of the rst stage the DM believes that the third party will choose A with
probability  and B with probability 1    for some specied  2 [0; 1]. Let free
denote the choice of the DM at stage one to retain the role of choosing an action at
stage two. Let thirddenote the choice at stage one to let the third party choose at
stage two.
The analysis for a Bayesian DM is straightforward. Generically this DM will not
be indi¤erent between the two actions, and, as the third party randomizes, she will
strictly prefer freeand thus to retain the power to choose the action.
Consider now maximin utility. Here one has to specify how decision making takes
place in this sequential setting. A natural approach (for an axiomatization see Sinis-
calchi, 2006) is to solve via backwards induction. If the decision maker chooses free
in stage one, then she faces the decision problem in Table 3 in stage two where she
will then choose A with probability (z   x) = (y   x+ z   w) and B otherwise to then
guarantee a minimal utility of (yz   xw) = (y   x+ z   w) : Notice that the choice of
this mixed action yields the same expected utility in both states. Anticipating the
outcome obtained in stage 2 when choosing freein stage 1 yields the reduced decision
problem in stage 1 shown in Table 4. It then follows easily along the same line of
argument as in the safe versus risky model that this decision maker chooses free.
Consider now the minimax regret DM. Looking again rst at the decision in stage
2 after having chosen freein stage 1 we nd that the DM chooses A with probability
(y   x) = (y   x+ z   w). Anticipating this choice in stage 2 we obtain the reduced
form for stage 1 shown in Table 5. For whichever value of  in [0; 1] we nd that the
10
payo¤  
free (y x)y+(z w)x
z w+y x
(y x)w+(z w)z
z w+y x
third y + (1  )x w + (1  ) z
Table 5: The decision problem faced in stage 1 by a minimax regret agent.
minimax regret DM will mix between freeand third.
To sum up, both a Bayesian DM and a maximin utility DM have a preference for
exerting their freedom of choice, while a minimax regret DM, in randomizing across
the two choice options, exhibits a weaker preference towards freedom of choice.
3.3 Value of Information
Information plays an important role when making choices under uncertainty as more
information can reduce this uncertainty. In the following we investigate the incentives
for the gathering information when this is costly.
We build on the decision problem with two actions and two states presented in
the previous subsection. To simplify notation we normalize payo¤s so that x = 0 and
y = 1, which can be done without loss of generality. We add the restriction that
w < 1 and z > 0 in order to rule out that all outcomes in one state are larger than all
outcomes in the other state. We add the possibility to learn more about the true state
as follows. By incurring a cost c the DM learns the true state with probability  and
does not learn anything new with probability 1   , where c > 0 and  2 (0; 1) are
given. Hence, even when the DM pays c she may not learn anything. The strategy of
the DM who decides not to purchase information and to choose action C is denoted by
Cn: The strategy to buy information, to choose the best action whenever the true state
is revealed and to choose action C when no new information is revealed is denoted by
Cb: Payo¤s of the enlarged decision problem are given in Table 6.
Consider a Bayesian decision maker who puts prior probability  on state  occur-
ring. It is easily shown that this DM has the highest willingness to pay for information
when the prior (; (1  )) is such that she is indi¤erent between An and Bn: This
indi¤erence holds when  = 0 := (z   w) = (1 + z   w). Note that when  = 0 then
the Bayesian is also indi¤erent between Ab and Bb. So the expected payo¤ to not
buying information is equal to
z
1 + z   w;
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payo¤ state  state 
An 1 w
Bn 0 z
Ab 1  c z + (1  )w   c
Bb    c z   c
Table 6: The choice setting revealing the value of information for the decision maker.
The DM is allowed to acquire at cost c a probability  of learning the true state.
while the payo¤ to buying information is equal to
z +  (z   w)  c (1 + z   w)
1 + z   w :
For this particular prior it follows that the Bayesian will buy information if c <
 (z   w) = (1 + z   w). Thus, for any prior  on state  there exists c0 () such that
the Bayesian DM will buy information if c < c0 () and she will not buy information
if c > c0 () where
c0 ()   (z   w)
1 + z   w:
In fact it is easily shown that c0 () is strictly below this threshold whenever  6= 0,
where c0 () can be arbitrarily small if  is either su¢ ciently large or su¢ ciently small.
Let us now turn to a maximin utility DM. Assume that this DM decides not to buy
information. Since w < 1 and z > 0 it follows that the DM will mix between An and
Bn in the same way she would mix between A and B in the original decision problem.
Both An and Bn will maximize expected payo¤s given the mixed action of malevolent
Nature. Nature will then choose state  with probability 0, as only then will the DM
be indi¤erent between An and Bn. Given this strategy of Nature, we determined above
thatAn andBn are only best responses if and only if c   (z   w) = (1 + z   w) : Thus,
the maximin utility DM will buy information if
c <
 (z   w)
1 + z   w;
and will not buy information if instead the above holds with >.
Finally consider the minimax regret DM. In Table 7 we have transformed utility
into regret.
We argue analogously to the case of maximin utility. If the minimax regret DM
does not buy information then she mixes between An and Bn: Note that Nature again
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states
regret  
An 0 z   w
Bn 1 0
Ab c (1  ) (z   w) + c
Bb 1 + c   c
Table 7: The value of informationchoice setting in terms of regret.
ensures that she will do so by assigning probability 0 to state . Thus we conclude
as in the case of maximin utility that the minimax regret DM buys information if
c <
 (z   w)
1 + z   w;
and will not buy information if instead the above holds with >.
To summarize, the Bayesian is always less willing to buy information than either the
maximin utility or the minimax regret type, where the latter two have the same thresh-
old on costs below which they start buying information. The prior of the Bayesian
makes her more condent about the situation and hence less willing to pay for more
information.
3.4 Summary
Combining the di¤erent attitudes across these three decision problems we identify the
following behavioral patterns. Bayesians may or may not like safe choices, enjoy being
unconstrained in their choices and give relatively low value to acquiring information.
Maximin DMs like safe options, like freedom and value information highly. Finally,
minimax regret DMs are willing to partially engage in uncertain scenarios, moderately
like freedom and give high value to new information.
4 Estimating Models of Choice under Uncertainty
We now use our models and their predictions across the three choice problems developed
above to investigate the di¤erent ways in which Europeans deal with uncertainty. The
data we use is based on answers to some questions posed in the European Values Survey
(EVS). The hypothesis is that there are at least three behavioral types, the Bayesian,
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the maximin utility DM and the minimax regret DM. We proceed by establishing a
link between the decision problems of the previous section and some of the questions in
the survey, which allows us to predict the answers of each of the three DM types across
these questions. This link is then brought to the data using a latent class analysis in
which the proportions of each type are estimated.
4.1 Linking Choice Problems to Questions
In the following we identify ve questions from the European Values Survey (EVS) that
are related to each of our choice problems. In particular two questions are associated
with the safe vs. uncertainmodel, two to the freedom of choicemodel, and one to
the value of infomodel. For clarity only summaries of the questions are presented
here. We have included all the details in Appendix A.
Consider rst the conict between safe and uncertain. The rst question in this
group, coded C013 in the EVS, is taken from the section of the questionnaire devoted
to work. It asks: Would you mention job securityas an important aspect in a
job?. The possible answers are mentionand not mention. We identify job security
as being a safe option that is implicitly contrasted in this question to job insecurity,
an option with an uncertain outcome. Mentioning job security can be directly inter-
preted as not wanting to lose ones job. However job security also indirectly means to
forego opportunities of getting a better job. In light of the analysis of the safe versus
uncertain model, we predict how each of the three types will answer each question.
Some Bayesians will mention good job security while others will not. Maximin DMs
will always mention job security. Minimax regret DMs will always hedge against un-
certainty by randomizing, so some will mention and some will not mention job security.
However, since we cannot observe this randomization we obtain the same prediction
for the minimax regret DM as we have for the Bayesian. Not all will answer mention
but not all will answer not mention.
The second question associated with the conict between safe and uncertain, coded
D026 in the EVS, is selected from the group of questions devoted to family. It reads:
A marriage or a long-term stable relationship is necessary to be happy. We group the
possible answers into agree, not agree(see Appendix A for details). Paralleling the
explanation given for the previous question, we identify the long-term stable relation-
ship as the safe option, to be implicitly compared to the more uncertain life scenarios
unfolding when opting for short-term and/or non stable relationships. Bayesians may
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agree or disagree with the statement, maximin utility DMs always agree, while min-
imax regret DMs randomize across the answer options and, hence, are associated to
the same prediction as that for Bayesians.
Freedom of choice is addressed in two questions, respectively selected from the
worksection of the questionnaire and from the one devoted to perceptions of life.
The former, coded C016, asks: Would you mention the opportunity to use your own
initiativeas an important aspect in a job?. The possible answers to this question
are mentionand not mention. Following our three choice models we predict that
both Bayesians and maximin utility DMs like freedom of choice and hence will choose
mention, while for minimax regret DMs some will choose mentionand others will
choose not mention.
The other question in the survey capturing a taste for freedom is the one coded A029
and asking: Would you mention independenceas an especially important quality that
children should be encouraged to learn at home?. The possible answers are mention
and not mention. Once again, given our three choice models, we predict that both
Bayesians and maximin utility DMs will answer mention, while for minimax regret
DMs some will choose mentionand others will choose not mention.
Finally consider the following question, selected from the work section of the
questionnaire and coded C012: Would you mention not too much pressureas an
important aspect in a job?. The possible answers are mentionand not mention.
Pressure can be interpreted as the feeling of stressful urgency (Oxford Dictionary)
associated to the lack of time to be able to deliberate and to gather more information.
Lower value of information can mean that the decision maker is less concerned about
pressure. We focus on the value of information aspect of this question and, according
to our model, predict that a Bayesian does not feel much pressure and is likely to
choose not mentionas information has less value. Both a maximin utility DM and
a minimax regret DM care more about information, so we predict that they feel more
pressure and hence are likely to choose mention.
Table 8 summarizes the predicted answers from our three decision types across the
ve questions.
4.2 Empirical Analysis
We now wish to estimate how many individuals behave consistently with each of our
behavioral models.
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Group Question Content Bayesian Maximin M. regret
safe C013 Job security some mention, some not mention randomize
safe D026 Long-term relationship some agree, some not agree randomize
free C016 Initiative mention mention randomize
free A029 Independence mention mention randomize
info C012 No pressure not mention mention mention
Table 8: Theoretical predictions
4.2.1 Selecting the Method
We need to select a method for estimating the existence of such underlying behavioral
models in the EVS data. Flexibility of the method is desired as we do not expect the
vast majority to behave entirely according to one of the three models. Our models are
normative and many di¤erent concerns come into play when interpreting a question and
selecting an answer. We are happy to be able to explain regularities and tendencies.
Thus we wish to choose a method that allows di¤erent questions to be assigned di¤erent
degrees of importance in explaining regularities. Our behavioral models should be able
to compete with alternative systematic ways of responding to the questions. At the
same time we need to be able to correct for the fact that a less restrictive denition
of a type will always explain the data more accurately. We choose to perform a latent
class analysis as this gives us the desired exibility and the means to investigate the
role of degrees of freedom in explaining the data.
Previous investigations on European attitudes towards uncertainty (Hofstede, 2001)
have relied on counting the number of answers consistent with each behavioral model.
Each question is given equal weight. However, the questions asked in surveys are just
approximations of the question we are really interested in (Do you mind ambiguity?
or What is your type?). To ignore that some questions are better approximations
than others is to ignore that the explanatory power of the questions may vary. For
example, consider the extreme case that one of the included questions has no explana-
tory power. By just counting the correct answers this irrelevant question has the same
impact as the other questions. Our method instead does not impose equal explanatory
power of the questions but determines their relevance endogenously.
Latent class analysis is a method to nd classes (or clusters) in the data when the
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relative importance of the questions is not known2. In our model a class represents a
DM type. In addition to our three types we add an unrestricted (or free) type in order
to pick up regularities not predicted by our models. Individuals belonging to a given
type are assumed to answer any given question according to a probability distribution
that only depends on the type and on the question. The proportions of types as well as
the probability distributions over the answers for each question and type are estimated
by maximizing the likelihood of the data. So the estimated behavior within a class
(or associated with a type) is a distribution of answers to each question. Allowing for
probabilitistic distributions over the set of answers introduces the desired exibility to
be able to capture the importance of each question for each type. Flexibility is limited
by the bounds imposed by the prediction we make for the given type. For instance,
when the type imposes that one of two answers is more likely than the other and one
estimates that the two probabilities coincide, then we nd that this question plays no
special role in explaining responses.
We seek to compare attitudes towards uncertainty across Europe. To this end we
pool the data across all countries and estimate behavior of each type as well as the
proportions across Europe. Using the country specic information we then derive the
induced distribution of types for each country. A separate analysis for each country
would not be useful for this objective as estimated types identied with a probability
distribution for each question would then be di¢ cult to compare across countries.
4.2.2 Details of the Method
In the following we briey describe latent class analysis assuming, rst of all, that data
comes from a single country. Let K denote the set of DM types. Denote the sample
proportion of type k 2 K by k. Of course, k 2 [0; 1] and
P
k2K k = 1.
Let Q be the set of questions. For question q 2 Q, let Aq denote the set of pos-
sible answers. We assume that, conditional on the type of individual, the answers
across questions are uncorrelated. Let the probability that a k-type individual an-
swers question q with answer a 2 Aq be denoted by kq(a) where kq(a) 2 [0; 1] andP
a2Aq kq(a) = 1.
Let  be the parameter vector containing the sample proportions k for k 2 K and
the probabilities of the answers kq(a) for k 2 K, q 2 Q and a 2 Aq.
2Lazarsfeld (1950), Goodman (1974) and Haberman (1979) are the classic references. See Hage-
naars and McCutcheon (2002) for an overview of recent innovations.
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Up to this point a type is simply an index. However each type is typically associated
to an exogenously imposed set of restrictions, which determine for each question a set
of possible answers or distributions over answers. The restrictions we impose for our
three behavioral types are specied in the next section. Let  be the set containing
the allowed parameter vectors  that are compatible with the exogenously imposed
restrictions on the types.
Denote the set of individuals by I. Let the answer of individual i to question q be
denoted by aiq 2 Aq. The loglikelihood of the sample faiqgi2I;q2Q of answers for each
individual across all individuals is then given by
L() =
X
i2I
log
X
k2K
k
Y
q2Q
kq(aiq)

:
The maximum likelihood estimator is then simply argmax2 L().
When the sample consists of all countries, a correction is needed to preserve rep-
resentation due to the di¤erent country sizes. Ideally one would like to have a sample
that consists of the same proportion of individuals relative to the total population in
each country. In order not to throw away observations, one considers averages when
too many individuals have been sampled. The adjustment is as follows. Denote the set
of countries by C. For country c 2 C, let the set of individuals be denoted by Ic, the
number of individuals in the sample by nc and the number of inhabitants from which
the sample was (potentially) drawn by pc. Let r = minc2C nc=pc be the minimum ratio
of individuals per inhabitant. It then follows that rpc  nc for all c 2 C. We now act
as if the proportion r was selected from each country, rescaling the above likelihood by
rpc=n. With this correction term the loglikelihood becomes
L() =
X
c2C
rpc
nc
X
i2Ic
log
X
k2K
k
Y
q2Q
kq(aiq)

:
All test statistics are corrected for the population size likewise.
4.2.3 Imposing the Types
Each class is associated with a type. We have developed predictions for the behavior
of each of the three models in dealing with uncertainty (see Table 8). In the following
we show how these predictions enter the empirical model to be estimated.
If an individual is of a particular type, we expect her to answer the questions in
line with that type. However, the vast majority of individuals will not answer the
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Question Content Bayesian Maximin M. regret
C013 job security 1
4
 (M)  3
4
(M)  1
2
1
4
 (M)  3
4
D026 long-term relation 1
4
 (A)  3
4
(A)  1
2
1
4
 (A)  3
4
C016 initiative (M)  1
2
(M)  1
2
1
4
 (M)  3
4
A029 independence (M)  1
2
(M)  1
2
1
4
 (M)  3
4
C012 no pressure (M)  1
2
(M)  1
2
(M)  1
2
Table 9: Conditions to impose on types
questions in a way that exactly coincides with one of the DM types. As we said above,
our estimation method assumes that a DM type has a probability distribution over the
answers of each question. If an individual is of a particular type, we thus expect that
she answers the questions in line with that type with a high probability. In other words
we predict the answer of the majority.
We now derive the restrictions imposed on the answer frequencies for each of the
three behavioral types. Consider rst the case where our model reveals a unique
prediction, for example a maximin utility DM is predicted to answer mentionto the
job security question. To allow exibility, so that di¤erent questions can have di¤erent
degrees of predictive power, we contrast our predictions to a hypothetical random DM
who is equally likely to choose all answers. So the random DM chooses mention(M)
and not mention(NM) with the same probability. The maximin utility DM should
then outperform the random DM and answer mentionwith a probability of at least
1/2. In other words, we predict that there are more maximin utility DMs answering
mentionthan not mention. We also have to specify how we deal with ambiguous
predictions, for instance with Bayesiansattitude towards job security. We want to
rule out that our estimation allows for all Bayesians in Europe to like job security or
for all to dislike job security. Hence, we impose heterogeneity by requiring that the
proportion of Bayesians liking job security lies between 25% and 75%: In this fashion
we translate each of our theoretical predictions (see Table 8) into restrictions on the
parameter set  shown in Table 9 (where A stands for agree).
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5 The Findings
We now show the results of the maximum likelihood estimation on the pooled data
of the EU15 countries. We have estimated both the unconstrainedmodel, that is
the model only made up of free types, and the constrainedmodel, that is the model
obtained by imposing the conditions on the types specied in Table 9. Moreover,
assuming that Bayesians (B), maximin utility (M) or minimax regret (R) are the only
DM types in Europe might be too strong. We therefore also perform the estimation of
the constrained model with one free type (F). The model with four free types is also
estimated.
Models statistics are summarized in Table 10, where C() and U() respectively
denote the constrained and the unconstrained models, while 3; 4 stand for the number
of types included in the estimation.
Statistic Model
C(3) C(4) U(3) U(4)
Akaike 58:0  12:2  10:1  9:1
Bayesian  53:2  97:2  101:6  61:4
Pearson 93:6 13:8 17:7 6:9
Likelihood Ratio 92:0 13:8 17:9 6:9
(0:95) 27:6 22:4 23:7 15:5
df 17 13 14 8
Table 10: The statistics for the constrained and unconstrained models with three and
four types. In addition the table shows the 95% critical values and the degrees of
freedom.
For the unconstrained model, with both three and four types, the test statistics are
within the 95% condence range, suggesting that the model performs fairly well in ex-
plaining the data. The constrained model with only three types has instead rather high
Pearson and Likelihood Ratio values, which are known to be conservative measures for
large samples, and is acceptable only under the Bayesian criterion, which favors small
models in terms of parameters. However, by adding one free type, the constrained
model ts the data accurately according to each of the four criteria. Moreover, the
Akaike criterion actually prefers the constrained model with four types to the uncon-
strained models with either three or four types, while for the Bayesian criterion this
20
constrained model performs better than the unconstrained model with four types and
only slightly worse than the unconstrained model with three types. Overall we nd
that the data can be explained by imposing the behavioral conditions on the types
dictated by our normative models.
We will now focus on the constrained model with four types. Let us proceed with
the analysis of the parameters estimated. The rst row of Table 11 reports the types
of decision makers included in the estimation, the last row contains their sample pro-
portions for all of Europe. We nd 69% of the answers can be explained by one of our
three models, the majority, equal to 39%, fall within the Bayesian model. Maximin
utility and minimax regret types account for 23% and 6% respectively. The rest of the
sample, 31%, is captured by the free type.
Answers M/A in % Bayesian Maximin U. M. regret Fourth Avg
Job security 59 98 25 58 62
Long-term relation 49 61 25 67 53
Initiative 50 79 48 26 51
Independence 76 50 57 16 51
No pressure 13 87 50 10 32
Proportion 39 23 6 31
Table 11: The estimation results for the model with four decision maker types. For
each decision maker type the table shows its population proportion and the percentage
probabilities of answer agree(A) to the question on long-term relationand of answer
mention(M) to the other four questions.
The other rows of the same table show the answer percentage probabilities of the
four types for each question. In particular, the row associated with question on long-
term relationship reports the probability for each type of answering agree(A), while
the other rows report the probabilities for each type of answering mention (M) to
the other four questions. Needless to say, subtracting these numbers from 100 gives us
the percentage probabilities of answering respectively not agreeand not mentionfor
each type. Asterisks are added to indicate that the constraints are binding. It is worth
comparing the probabilities in Table 11 with the answer frequencies for the whole
sample reported in the nal column of the same table, which can be interpreted as
describing the averagetype. For instance, consider the question about preference for
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not too much pressureat work. Around 32% of the sample do mention not too much
pressureas an important aspect in a job (that is, answer M), while the remaining
68% do not mention it. We obtain rather extreme and opposite predictions about
the behavior of Bayesian and the free type on the one hand, and the behavior of the
maximin utility type on the other. The estimated value for the minimax regret type is
instead binding at the boundary imposed by predicting that this type chooses M with
probability greater than or equal to 50%:Overall, allowing for di¤erent behavioral types
gives us the possibility of capturing the behavioral heterogeneity behind the answers to
this question. Roughly, the same reasoning holds for the other four questions, for which
our types perform reasonably well in uncovering the heterogeneity in the answers. At
the same time our types impose limits to this heterogeneity and the constraints are
binding in 1=3 of the cases with most constraints binding for the minimax regret type.
As mentioned above, latent class analysis allows us to give di¤erent weights to
di¤erent questions. For instance, while we include the questions on job security and on
long-term relationship both within the safe versus risky model, we allow for di¤erent
degrees in which the value of safe options inuences the answers to these questions.
For the maximin utility type we nd a very close alignment between mentioning job
security and the value of safe options as indicated by the value of 98%. On the other
hand, long-term relationship and safety seem to be less aligned given our estimated
61% of choosing M:
Consider the degree to which our estimates correspond to our predictions. Looking
at the number of binding constraints we see that the Bayesian and maximin type
predict fairly well across questions, each with one binding constraint respectively on
initiativeand independencequestions. Minimax regret behavior only predicts well
for the questions within the freedom of choice category.
Finally Table 11 also allows us to delineate the behavioral traits of the free or
fourth type. This type neither likes nor dislikes safe options, dislikes freedom of choice
and does not mind pressure and thus, in our interpretation, places a relatively low
importance on acquiring additional information. One may interpret this type as one
who does not use initiative and, hence, does not care about either the availability of
safe options or the pressure that may be present if she had to make a choice.
Table 12 reports the sample proportions of the decision maker types for each country
in EU15. The table can also be interpreted as providing the average relative proba-
bilities that an individual belongs to each of the decision maker types. In Figures 1
and 2 we plot the frequencies of, respectively, the maximin utility types against the
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Bayesians, and the free against minimax regret types.
Country Type
B M R F
Austria 54:0 15:4 4:9 25:7
Belgium 36:9 17:7 8:5 37:0
Denmark 61:9 10:6 7:9 19:6
Finland 44:7 22:4 7:8 25:0
France 35:8 9:2 5:7 49:3
Germany 53:1 18:8 4:5 23:5
Greece 32:3 37:4 5:4 24:8
Ireland 34:9 34:0 7:4 23:6
Italy 25:2 45:7 6:0 23:1
Luxemburg 38:6 23:3 7:0 31:1
Netherlands 44:9 13:6 16:9 24:7
Portugal 27:7 20:4 4:8 47:1
Spain 27:4 29:4 5:4 37:8
Sweden 47:1 20:7 10:1 22:2
United Kingdom 41:7 20:3 7:6 30:4
EU15 39:3 23:2 6:4 31:1
Table 12: The sample proportions of the decision maker types for the constrained model
with four decision maker types. The table shows the average relative probabilities that
an individual belongs to each of the decision maker types.
While Bayesians average 39:3% of the entire sample, their proportions range from
a minimum of 25:2% in Italy to a maximum of 61:9% in Denmark. The pattern
followed by the proportions across European countries is evident. Southern European
countries, namely Greece (32%), Italy (25:2%), Portugal (27:7%) and Spain (27:4%),
are all clearly below the average. Most Continental countries, namely Austria (54%),
Germany (53:1%) and the Netherlands (44:9%), as well as all Scandinavian countries,
namely Denmark (61:9%), Finland (44:7%) and Sweden (47:1%) are instead all clearly
above the average. The group of countries aroundthe average is composed of Belgium
(36:9%), France (35:8%), Luxembourg (38:6%), as well as Ireland (34:9%) and the UK
(41:7%).
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Even if less clear-cut and with lower heterogeneity, a similar and reverse pattern
emerges when looking at the proportions of maximin utility types. The average pro-
portion is 23:2%, ranging from a minimum of 9:2% in France to a maximum of 45:7%
in Italy. A group of southern countries, composed of Greece (32:3%), Italy (45:7%)
and Spain (29:4%), plus Ireland (34%), stand clearly above the average. A fraction of
Continental countries, specically Austria (15:4%), Belgium (17:7%), France (9:2%),
Germany (18:8%) and the Netherlands (13:6%), plus Denmark (10:6%), present in-
stead relatively low proportions of maximin utility types. Around the average we nd
an admittedly rather heterogenous group of countries composed of Portugal (20:4%),
Luxembourg (23:3%), Finland (22:4%), Sweden (20:7%) and the UK (20:3%).
From these estimates a clear and remarkable di¤erence in the attitude towards
uncertainty seems to emerge between southern European countries (plus Ireland to
some extent) and continental/northern European countries. Relatively low propor-
tions of Bayesians and high proportions of maximin utility types usually characterize
the former group, while exactly the opposite pattern holds for the latter. Given our
denitions of the two types, the former group is then populated with agents holding a
relatively stronger preference for safe options and a greater aversion towards the feel-
ing of pressure. In contrast, the latter group is characterized by agents more prone to
face uncertain scenarios and less sensitive to situations of great pressure. This result,
whose graphical intuition is provided in Figure 1, is consistent with the north-south
interpretation common in the cross-country psychological literature.
The percentage of minimax regret types is around 6:4% across the whole European
sample. The countries with respectively the lowest and highest estimated proportions
of minimax regret types are Austria (4:9%) and the Netherlands (16:9%). We nd
some evidence supporting a weak northern patternfor minimax regret types, as the
highest proportions are located among northern countries. However, apart from the
Netherlands and Sweden (10:1%), the estimated proportions are mostly concentrated
near the average. We in fact nd all countries except for the latter two in the range
between 4:9% and 7:9%, suggesting that the behavioral pattern corresponding to the
minimax regret type is not widespread and is rather homogenous across Europe.
Finally the free type averages 31:1% of the sample and ranges from a minimum of
19:6% in Denmark to a maximum of 49:3% in France. We nd a remarkable east-west
divide (see Figure 2). The highest values are taken by countries in the west, namely
France, Portugal (47:1%), Spain (37:8%), Belgium (37%), Luxembourg (31:1%) and
United Kingdom (30:4%). In fact, the fourth type captures majority behavior in the
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rst four countries listed.
It may be worthwhile to interpret the results of our empirical analysis in light
of the expanding literature on ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961, Schmeidler, 1989, Gilboa-
Schmeidler, 1989). Ambiguity is associated with the way the decision maker confronts
an uncertain environment and, in particular, with the lack of prior over the states.
Bayesians behave as if they formed priors to transform uncertainty into risk and, hence,
deal with an unambiguous scenario. On the other hand, maximin and minimax regret
types behave as if they did not have any prior and thus perceive the choice scenario as
ambiguous. The distinctive feature of the free type seems to be its aversion towards
freedom of choice which, as we claimed above, may also be related to the behavior ex-
hibited in the other two choice contexts, safe vs. uncertainand value of information.
The free type can then be classied among the non prior-friendlydecision makers to
the extent that a natural implication of the prior-based approach is a positive taste for
freedom of choice (see Subsection 3.2). The results of our empirical analysis suggest
that, in individual decision making under uncertainty, ambiguity plays a prominent
role across European countries, and the more so as we move to the south of Europe.
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A The EVS Questionnaire
In Subsection 4.1 we have illustrated the questions selected from the EVS questionnaire
and the associated answer options. In the following we report the exact way in which
they appear in the questionnaire.
Questions C013, C016, C012 are structurally very similar. They all start with the
following statement: Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are impor-
tant. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important
in a job. Each question is then associated to a specic aspect which may or may not
be mentioned. In particular C013 is associated to job security, C016 to opportunity
to use initiative, and C012 to not too much pressure. In the questionnaire there are
fteen more questions structured in this way, each specifying a di¤erent aspect. The
answer options are 0; 1 respectively standing for not mention, mention. There is no
limit in the number of aspects that can be mentioned out of the eighteen presented.
Question D026 asks the respondent how he/she feels about the following statement:
A marriage or a long-term stable relationship is necessary to be happy. The possible
answers are 1; 2; 3; 4; 5, standing respectively for agree strongly, agree, neither agree
or disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. We combine answers 1; 2 and answers 3; 4; 5,
label them respectively with agreeand not agreeso as to have two answer options
only. Answer 3 is allocated to not agreeto obtain groups of roughly equal size.
Finally question A029 belongs to a group of seventeen questions all starting as
follows: Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home.
Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?. Each of the seventeen
questions mentions a di¤erent quality. The one corresponding to question A029 is
independence. The answer options are 0; 1 respectively standing for not mentioned,
important. The respondent cannot answer importantto more than ve questions.
B Data Treatment
The data comes from the fourth wave of the European Values Survey. Our country
choice is based on the member states of the European Union in this period. In all
countries the survey took place in 1999, except for Finland where it was held in 2000.
The total sample consists of fteen countries and 20,729 individuals (see Table
13). Within a country the individuals are stratied according to geographic population
density. The documentation of the EVS provides more information about the sampling
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country original n relevant n population adjusted n
Austria 1,522 1,467 8.0 112
Belgium 1,912 1,669 10.2 144
Denmark 1,023 941 5.3 75
Finland 1,038 1,010 5.2 73
France 1,615 1,582 58.5 823
Germany 2,036 1,784 82.0 1,154
Greece 1,142 1,109 10.9 153
Ireland 1,012 966 3.7 53
Italy 2,000 1,895 56.9 800
Luxembourg 1,211 745 0.4 6
Netherlands 1,003 974 15.8 222
Portugal 1,000 961 10.2 143
Spain 1,200 1,131 39.8 560
Sweden 1,015 962 8.9 125
United Kingdom 2,000 1,698 58.6 824
Europe 20,729 18,894 312.0 5,264
Table 13: The number of individuals in the original sample, the number of individu-
als after dropping non-citizens and incomplete observations, the population sizes (in
millions) and the number of observations adjusted for the country size.
procedures and non-response. See European Values Survey (n.d.).
To get a clearer image of country specic behavior, we drop all individuals who are
not citizens of the country they live in. This eliminates 6.2% of the observations from
the whole sample, and apart from Luxembourg (37.3%), the United Kingdom (12.5%),
Belgium (11.2%) and Denmark (5.3%), less than 5% of the observations at the country
level.
For our 5 questions the answer options have been reported in Appendix A. There
exist However, four additional possibilities exist for each of the questions, namely:
 4 = not asked in the survey;  3 = not applicable;  2 = no answer3;  1 = dont
know. We have dropped all these data out of our sample. This eliminates 2.7% of the
3No answerdoes not mean that the respondent does not know but that she explicitly prefers not
to answer the question.
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observations in the whole sample, and apart from Germany (9.6%) less than 5% of the
observations at the country level.
Due to historical reasons, individuals living in one of the states of former East
Germany are overrepresented in the sample. We use data from the Statistisches Bun-
desamt Deutschland (n.d.) to construct the population proportion of the combined
formerly East German states in 1999. Individuals of these states are then weighted
so that their sample proportion equals their population proportion. This reduces the
e¤ective number of observations for Germany to 1,154.
In the pooled estimations we weigh individuals so that the e¤ective sample size of
a country is proportional to its population size in 1999 (data obtained from Eurostat,
n.d.). Germany is the country with the lowest ratio observations per inhabitant. The
adjusted number of observations for the other countries follows from multiplying the
country populations by this ratio. The e¤ective number of observations when correcting
for population size equals 5,264 (rounded).
In order to have a better representation of the country population, we weigh the
individuals of a country such that the fraction females in the sample equals the pop-
ulation fraction in 1999 (data obtained from Eurostat). For Germany this weighting
is performed for former East and West Germany individually (data obtained from
Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland).
C Test Statistics
For a specic country, the standard Pearson and likelihood ratio statistic measure
the di¤erence between the theoretical predictions and the data. Our Pearson and
likelihood ratio statistics are the sum of these country specic statistics. Our statistics
thus measure the aggregate di¤erence between the theoretical predictions and the data
for each country. In our case, each of the ve questions has 2 relevant answers. The
total number of cells thus equals 15  25 = 480. Note that we have 5,264 e¤ective
observations, which is enough for the statistic to be informative.
The degrees of freedom are the number of independent cells for Europe, 25 1 = 31,
minus the k  1 independent type specic proportions, minus the k 5 (2  1) = 5k
independent answer probabilities plus the number of binding constraints.
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of frequencies of Bayesian and maximin utility type behaviors.
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Figure 2: Scatter plot of frequencies of minimax regret and unconstrained type be-
haviors (labels belonging to the points within the box are contained in the box on the
upper right).
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